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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73846</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73846</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, canonicalizeParams in src/utils/cache.ts serializes request parameters with unescaped ampersand, equals-sign, and vertical-bar delimiters, allowing different logical parameter sets used by buildCacheKey to collide and an attacker to prime a shared cache with a response for a victim&amp;#39;s distinct query. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, canonicalizeParams in src/utils/cache.ts serializes request parameters with unescaped ampersand, equals-sign, and vertical-bar delimiters, allowing different logical parameter sets used by buildCacheKey to collide and an attacker to prime a shared cache with a response for a victim&amp;#39;s distinct query. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73846</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-78x9-fhhx-v2g6 — CKAN MCP Server: Cache-key canonicalization collision enables cache confusion / poisoning</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-78x9-fhhx-v2g6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. `canonicalizeParams` joins sorted `${key}=${value}` pairs with `&amp;amp;` and does not escape `&amp;amp;`, `=`, or the `|` field separators used in `buildCacheKey`. Two **different** logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the **same** key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an attacker can prime a colliding key so a victim&amp;#39;s distinct query (same `server_url`) is served the attacker&amp;#39;s cached response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/utils/cache.ts
export function canonicalizeParams(params) {
  const keys = Object.keys(params).sort();
  const pairs = [];
  for (const key of keys) {
    const value = params[key];
    if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;
    const serialized = typeof value === &amp;#34;object&amp;#34; ? JSON.stringify(value) : String(value);
    pairs.push(`${key}=${serialized}`);        // value not escaped
  }
  return pairs.join(&amp;#34;&amp;amp;&amp;#34;);                        // &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;#39; delimiter, injectable
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;export async function buildCacheKey(serverUrl, action, params) {
  const raw = `${serverUrl}|${action}|${canonicalizeParams(params)}`;  // &amp;#39;|&amp;#39; also unescaped
  return sha1Hex(raw);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed collisions (identical key):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `{ q: &amp;#34;budget&amp;#34;, rows: 10 }`  ≡  `{ q: &amp;#34;budget&amp;amp;rows=10&amp;#34; }`  → both canonicalize to `q=budget&amp;amp;rows=10`
- `{ filters: { a: &amp;#34;b&amp;#34; } }`  ≡  `{ filters:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The response cache derives its key from an ambiguous string serialization of the request parameters. `canonicalizeParams` joins sorted `${key}=${value}` pairs with `&amp;amp;` and does not escape `&amp;amp;`, `=`, or the `|` field separators used in `buildCacheKey`. Two **different** logical parameter sets can therefore serialize to the **same** key and share one cache entry. Because the cached value is whatever the upstream returned for whichever request populated the entry first, an attacker can prime a colliding key so a victim&amp;#39;s distinct query (same `server_url`) is served the attacker&amp;#39;s cached response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
// src/utils/cache.ts
export function canonicalizeParams(params) {
  const keys = Object.keys(params).sort();
  const pairs = [];
  for (const key of keys) {
    const value = params[key];
    if (value === undefined || value === null) continue;
    const serialized = typeof value === &amp;#34;object&amp;#34; ? JSON.stringify(value) : String(value);
    pairs.push(`${key}=${serialized}`);        // value not escaped
  }
  return pairs.join(&amp;#34;&amp;amp;&amp;#34;);                        // &amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;#39; delimiter, injectable
}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;export async function buildCacheKey(serverUrl, action, params) {
  const raw = `${serverUrl}|${action}|${canonicalizeParams(params)}`;  // &amp;#39;|&amp;#39; also unescaped
  return sha1Hex(raw);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed collisions (identical key):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `{ q: &amp;#34;budget&amp;#34;, rows: 10 }`  ≡  `{ q: &amp;#34;budget&amp;amp;rows=10&amp;#34; }`  → both canonicalize to `q=budget&amp;amp;rows=10`
- `{ filters: { a: &amp;#34;b&amp;#34; } }`  ≡  `{ filters:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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