https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 07:59:16 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73844 <p>CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF&#39;d to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.112.</p> <p>CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF&#39;d to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.112.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73844 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF&#39;d to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments).</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>`src/utils/http.ts` — the entire decoded upstream body is embedded in the thrown error, which `formatCkanError` returns to the tool result:</p> <p>```js } else { throw new CkanApiError( `CKAN API returned success=false: ${JSON.stringify(decodedData)}`, // full body reflected undefined, action ); } ```</p> <p>`src/worker.ts` — the catch-all handler returns the raw `Error.message` in the JSON-RPC `data` field:</p> <p>```js return new Response(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: &#39;2.0&#39;, error: { code: -32603, message: &#39;Internal error&#39;, data: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) }, // raw internal message id: null }), { status: 500, ... }); ```</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Reflects arbitrary upstream response content to the caller. Combined with the SSRF vectors (advisories #01/#06), an attacker can use this as the *read* channel: point the server at an internal endpoint and receive its body inside the `success=false` error string (turning otherwise-blind SSRF into a semi-blind/return-value SSRF for any host that reaches the guards). - Leaks interna…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>Error paths reflect raw upstream response bodies and internal exception messages back to the caller instead of a sanitized, generic message. When the server is pointed at (or redirected/SSRF&#39;d to) a host that returns a non-CKAN response, or when an internal exception occurs, the caller receives verbatim upstream content and internal detail (hostnames, internal IPs, DB errors, stack fragments).</p> <p>## Affected code</p> <p>`src/utils/http.ts` — the entire decoded upstream body is embedded in the thrown error, which `formatCkanError` returns to the tool result:</p> <p>```js } else { throw new CkanApiError( `CKAN API returned success=false: ${JSON.stringify(decodedData)}`, // full body reflected undefined, action ); } ```</p> <p>`src/worker.ts` — the catch-all handler returns the raw `Error.message` in the JSON-RPC `data` field:</p> <p>```js return new Response(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: &#39;2.0&#39;, error: { code: -32603, message: &#39;Internal error&#39;, data: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) }, // raw internal message id: null }), { status: 500, ... }); ```</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>- Reflects arbitrary upstream response content to the caller. Combined with the SSRF vectors (advisories #01/#06), an attacker can use this as the *read* channel: point the server at an internal endpoint and receive its body inside the `success=false` error string (turning otherwise-blind SSRF into a semi-blind/return-value SSRF for any host that reaches the guards). - Leaks interna…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6f9w-9hf2-5rg3