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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 03:15:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-72210 — CVE-2026-72210 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72210</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-72210</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72210</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72210</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the
end of the attribute record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within
the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte
out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;
  if (b) {
      if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one
          goto io_error;
      for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)
          deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads
one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in
the LCN delta bytes check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is
correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the
end of the attribute record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within
the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte
out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;
  if (b) {
      if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one
          goto io_error;
      for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)
          deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads
one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in
the LCN delta bytes check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is
correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72210</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hpv2-jq93-768m</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hpv2-jq93-768m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the
end of the attribute record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within
the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte
out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;
  if (b) {
      if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one
          goto io_error;
      for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)
          deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads
one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in
the LCN delta bytes check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is
correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the
end of the attribute record:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within
the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte
out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;
  if (b) {
      if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one
          goto io_error;
      for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)
          deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];
  }&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads
one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in
the LCN delta bytes check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is
correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hpv2-jq93-768m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72210</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72210</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 94 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:     attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:   b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;   if (b) {       if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one           goto io_error;       for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)           deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];   } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 94 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: fix off-by-one in mapping pairs decoding bounds checks In ntfs_mapping_pairs_decompress(), attr_end points one byte past the end of the attribute record:     attr_end = (u8 *)attr + le32_to_cpu(attr-&amp;gt;length); The two bounds checks validating that mapping pair data bytes fit within the attribute use strict greater-than (&amp;gt;), which allows a one-byte out-of-bounds read when the data extends exactly to attr_end:   b = *buf &amp;amp; 0xf;   if (b) {       if (unlikely(buf + b &amp;gt; attr_end))   // off-by-one           goto io_error;       for (deltaxcn = (s8)buf[b--]; b; b--)           deltaxcn = (deltaxcn &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 8) + buf[b];   } When buf + b == attr_end, the check evaluates to false and buf[b] reads one byte past the valid attribute boundary. The same pattern appears in the LCN delta bytes check. Fix both checks to use &amp;gt;= so that buf[b] at exactly attr_end is correctly rejected as out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-72210</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2852 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service herbeizuführen oder einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2852</guid>
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