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fkie_cve-2026-69246

Guzzle is an extensible PHP HTTP client. Prior to 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one libcurl would have generated. For a URI host written as 127.0.0.%31, filter_var() rejects the host as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31. An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever the host exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. This issue is fixed in versions 7.15.2 and 8.0.1.

GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33 — Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks

Affected: Packagist: guzzlehttp/guzzle

### Impact

In affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.

An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts `Set-Cookie` against the URI Guzzle produced, not the authority contacted, so for a raw divergent URI the cookie is stored under the URI host as written. Where Guzzle rewrote that URI but left a divergent `Host`, or where the caller supplied one, the cookie is stored under the canonical name and re…

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-69246

Affected: Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: guzzle, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: guzzle