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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:07:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64449</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64449</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64449</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64449</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
&amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    k…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
&amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    k…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fqjm-fj8x-6hp3</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fqjm-fj8x-6hp3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
&amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    k…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy
&amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf ==
PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without
bounding *ppos + count against size_buf.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size
(image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the
user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up
to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window
exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when
*ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller
rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors
the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() /
resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a
short transfer at end-of-buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model
checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
  Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68
    _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80
    vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]
    vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0
    k…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fqjm-fj8x-6hp3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64449 — staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64449</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64449</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-4039 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4039</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ALSA: caiaq: Use snd_card_free_when_closed() at disconnectionThe USB disconnect callback is supposed to be short and not too-longwaiting.  OTOH, the current code uses snd_card_free() atdisconnection, but this waits for the close of all used fds, hence itcan take long.  It eventually blocks the upper layer USB ioctls, whichmay trigger a soft lockup.An easy workaround is to replace snd_card_free() withsnd_card_free_when_closed().  This variant returns immediately whilethe release of resources is done asynchronously by the card devicerelease at the last close.This patch also splits the code to the disconnect and the free phases;the former is called immediately at the USB disconnect callback whilethe latter is called from the card destructor.(CVE-2024-56531)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:xsk: fix OOB map writes when deleting elementsJordy says: In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer(map-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer(k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value formap-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check: if (k &amp;amp;gt;= map-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries)  return -EINVAL;This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2),which is then used as an array index in m-&amp;amp;gt;xsk_map[k], which resultsin an out-of-bounds access. spi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:ALSA: caiaq: Use snd_card_free_when_closed() at disconnectionThe USB disconnect callback is supposed to be short and not too-longwaiting.  OTOH, the current code uses snd_card_free() atdisconnection, but this waits for the close of all used fds, hence itcan take long.  It eventually blocks the upper layer USB ioctls, whichmay trigger a soft lockup.An easy workaround is to replace snd_card_free() withsnd_card_free_when_closed().  This variant returns immediately whilethe release of resources is done asynchronously by the card devicerelease at the last close.This patch also splits the code to the disconnect and the free phases;the former is called immediately at the USB disconnect callback whilethe latter is called from the card destructor.(CVE-2024-56531)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:xsk: fix OOB map writes when deleting elementsJordy says: In the xsk_map_delete_elem function an unsigned integer(map-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries) is compared with a user-controlled signed integer(k). Due to implicit type conversion, a large unsigned value formap-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries can bypass the intended bounds check: if (k &amp;amp;gt;= map-&amp;amp;gt;max_entries)  return -EINVAL;This allows k to hold a negative value (between -2147483648 and -2),which is then used as an array index in m-&amp;amp;gt;xsk_map[k], which resultsin an out-of-bounds access. spi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/oesa-2026-4039</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64449</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64449</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy &amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80   Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68     _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80     vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]     vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0     ksys_wr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy &amp;#39;count&amp;#39; bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE.  When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end.  *ppos is &amp;gt;= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap.  This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge:   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80   Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68     _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80     vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user]     vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0     ksys_wr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64449</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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