https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 03:02:06 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64403 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64403 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982 certfr-2026-avi-0982 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64403 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value</p> <p>l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed.</p> <p>An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers.</p> <p>Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value</p> <p>l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed.</p> <p>An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers.</p> <p>Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64403 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wqwg-v9cc-cpq7 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value</p> <p>l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed.</p> <p>An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers.</p> <p>Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value</p> <p>l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed.</p> <p>An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers.</p> <p>Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wqwg-v9cc-cpq7 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64403 msrc_CVE-2026-64403 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64403 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> <p>kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64403 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64403 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527 <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.</p> <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527