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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:33:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64389</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64389</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1162 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1162</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64389</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64389</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_sess_setup()
    -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true
    -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()
       -&amp;gt; session_user()
       -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
          -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
             -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()
             -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)
             -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
          -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)
    -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_sess_setup()
    -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true
    -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()
       -&amp;gt; session_user()
       -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
          -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
             -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()
             -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)
             -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
          -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)
    -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fxvf-vm38-6pxw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fxvf-vm38-6pxw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_sess_setup()
    -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true
    -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()
       -&amp;gt; session_user()
       -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
          -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
             -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()
             -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)
             -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
          -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)
    -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response.
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even
when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on
an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire
binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a
bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb2_sess_setup()
    -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true
    -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()
       -&amp;gt; session_user()
       -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
          -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()
             -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()
             -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)
             -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch
          -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)
    -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to
sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on
authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful
authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fxvf-vm38-6pxw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64389 — ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64389</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64389</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64389</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64389</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed. With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned. Relevant path:   smb2_sess_setup()     -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true     -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()        -&amp;gt; session_user()        -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()           -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()              -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()              -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)              -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch           -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)     -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed. With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess-&amp;gt;sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned. Relevant path:   smb2_sess_setup()     -&amp;gt; conn-&amp;gt;binding = true     -&amp;gt; ntlm_authenticate()        -&amp;gt; session_user()        -&amp;gt; ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()           -&amp;gt; ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2()              -&amp;gt; calc_ntlmv2_hash()              -&amp;gt; hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key)              -&amp;gt; crypto_memneq() returns mismatch           -&amp;gt; KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess-&amp;gt;sess_key, ...)     -&amp;gt; out_err without expiring the binding session Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess-&amp;gt;sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64389</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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