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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:20:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64339</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1162 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux d'Ubuntu. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un a…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1162</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1162</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64339</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len)
into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
		return -EMSGSIZE;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
&amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len)
into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
		return -EMSGSIZE;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
&amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m28f-fmgf-v7cw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m28f-fmgf-v7cw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len)
into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
		return -EMSGSIZE;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
&amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of
the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len)
into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device
and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked
against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) ||
	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))))
		return -EMSGSIZE;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and
bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or
malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a
small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such
as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and
hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then
reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab
object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to
user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN
this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the
URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response
that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing
&amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m28f-fmgf-v7cw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64339</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 112 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len) into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: 	if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || 	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) 		return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing &amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof(*bpk…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 112 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt-&amp;gt;len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf, allocated with size usbio-&amp;gt;rxbuf_len) into the caller&amp;#39;s buffer.  bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: 	if ((obuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || 	    (ibuf_len &amp;gt; (usbio-&amp;gt;txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) 		return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe().  A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len.  memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object.  The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len.  Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing &amp;#34;act &amp;lt; sizeof(*bpk…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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