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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:07:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64307</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64307</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64307</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0981 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0981</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0981</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0981</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64307</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64307</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64307</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wv9v-6465-83fw</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wv9v-6465-83fw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for
SNP_CONFIG.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it
could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were
running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case
that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is
  loaded
* check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing
* once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until
  the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wv9v-6465-83fw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23881-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64307</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64307</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG) Sashiko notes: &amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a &amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., &amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN &amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the &amp;gt; host? Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for SNP_CONFIG. This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options: * do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is   loaded * check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing * once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until   the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 119 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG) Sashiko notes: &amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a &amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., &amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN &amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the &amp;gt; host? Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for SNP_CONFIG. This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options: * do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is   loaded * check each cpu&amp;#39;s HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing * once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until   the ccp module is unloaded&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64307</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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