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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 21:20:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64294</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64294</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1031 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1031</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1031</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1031</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64294</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64294</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to
it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to
it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rgg7-9234-2h22</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rgg7-9234-2h22</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to
it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for
side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done
against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s
idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1
2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA
on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation
3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign,
because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses
the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a
0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to
it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a
file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch
the various users in mm to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion
with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rgg7-9234-2h22</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64294 — mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64294</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64294</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64294</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64294</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file&amp;#39;s mount&amp;#39;s idmap.  This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn&amp;#39;t supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn&amp;#39;t have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection &amp;amp; an off-list discussion with Jan Kara.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64294</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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