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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:42:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64274</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64274</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64274</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64274</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64274</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64274</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pfx5-jw3v-f6mp</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pfx5-jw3v-f6mp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported
by the device into an on-stack buffer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only
runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num,
but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device
configuration block and is never clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit
controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up
to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num
of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes
ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into
point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the
92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts
point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pfx5-jw3v-f6mp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64274 — Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64274</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64274</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64274</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64274</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64274</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer 	u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: 	ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 245 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer 	u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: 	ts-&amp;gt;max_touch_num = ts-&amp;gt;config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] &amp;amp; 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts-&amp;gt;contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64274</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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