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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 10:06:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64273</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64273</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64273</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64273</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64273</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f;
	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) {
		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags))
			...
	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) {
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device regi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f;
	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) {
		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags))
			...
	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) {
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device regi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64273</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mwj6-9jph-6qp6</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mwj6-9jph-6qp6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f;
	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) {
		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags))
			...
	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) {
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device regi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by
taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and
using it to address the per-effect state array:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f;
	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) {
		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags))
			...
	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED,
				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) {
		...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but
core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index
of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an
out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[]
is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the
trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio /
iforce_usb object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB
interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force
feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or
clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against
the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so
the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the
device regi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mwj6-9jph-6qp6</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64273 — Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64273</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64273</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64273</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23477-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23477-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64273</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64273</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: 	i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f; 	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) { 		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, 				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) 			... 	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, 				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) { 		... 	} The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: 	i = data[1] &amp;amp; 0x7f; 	if (data[1] &amp;amp; 0x80) { 		if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, 				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) 			... 	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, 				      iforce-&amp;gt;core_effects[i].flags)) { 		... 	} The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries.  For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array.  core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()&amp;#39;d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it.  Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev-&amp;gt;ff-&amp;gt;max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64273</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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