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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:32:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2026-64269</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64269</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-64269</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0982 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Elles permettent à un attaquant de p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0982</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0982</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-64269</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64269</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt;
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed
chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide
local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs
layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id
and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in
rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not
checked against the chunk size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make
the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting
behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in
passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk
and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a
translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort
the connection. In eithe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt;
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed
chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide
local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs
layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id
and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in
rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not
checked against the chunk size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make
the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting
behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in
passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk
and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a
translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort
the connection. In eithe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-64269</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-ffxc-rc5x-r6rp</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffxc-rc5x-r6rp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt;
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed
chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide
local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs
layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id
and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in
rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not
checked against the chunk size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make
the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting
behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in
passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk
and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a
translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort
the connection. In eithe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source
scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the
peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via
RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt;
process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this
change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed
chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide
local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs
layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id
and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in
rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not
checked against the chunk size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make
the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting
behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in
passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk
and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a
translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort
the connection. In eithe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-ffxc-rc5x-r6rp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-64269 — RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64269</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-64269</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-64269</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11476-1 — kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.1.7-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11476-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:23881-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/suse-su-2026:23881-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-64269</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64269</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:   plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt; process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size. A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either cas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor:   plist-&amp;gt;length = le32_to_cpu(id-&amp;gt;rd_msg-&amp;gt;desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -&amp;gt; process_io_req() -&amp;gt; process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk&amp;#39;s MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size. A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk&amp;#39;s mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either cas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-64269</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-2527 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen, dazu können DoS-Angriffe, die Offenlegung von Informationen, die Beschädigung des Speichers oder die Umgehung von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen gehören.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-2527</guid>
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