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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-61443</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61443</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI before 1.6.78 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in SkillTools.run_skill_script() that executes scripts without path containment validation. Attackers can supply absolute file paths to execute arbitrary scripts from any filesystem location, including those outside the intended working directory.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI before 1.6.78 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in SkillTools.run_skill_script() that executes scripts without path containment validation. Attackers can supply absolute file paths to execute arbitrary scripts from any filesystem location, including those outside the intended working directory.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61443</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-c44f-37qr-gw3f — PraisonAI: SkillTools Executes Scripts Without Path Containment Validation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c44f-37qr-gw3f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`SkillTools.run_skill_script()` accepts a `script_path` parameter and executes it via `subprocess.run()` without any path containment validation. While `FileTools` has `_validate_path()` with traversal detection, `SkillTools` performs none. An LLM-directed call can execute arbitrary scripts from any filesystem location. The `@require_approval` decorator can be bypassed via YAML `approve:` for high-risk tools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/skill_tools.py` (lines 69-119):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def run_skill_script(self, script_path: str, ...):
    script_path = os.path.expanduser(script_path)
    if not os.path.isabs(script_path):
        script_path = os.path.join(self._working_directory, script_path)
    script_path = os.path.abspath(script_path)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if not os.path.exists(script_path):
        return f&amp;#34;Error: Script not found at {script_path}&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# No path traversal check, no containment validation
    # Directly executes whatever is at that path:
    result = subprocess.run(cmd, ...)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By contrast, `FileTools._validate_path()` (`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py`, lines 42-78) properly validates that the resolved path stays within the working directory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _validate_path(self, filepath: str) -&amp;gt; str:
    # ...
    cwd = os.path.abspath(os.getcwd())
    if os.path.commonpath([absolute, cwd]) != cwd:
        raise ValueError(f&amp;#34;Path traversal detected: {filepath} escapes workspace {cwd}&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SkillTools` has…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`SkillTools.run_skill_script()` accepts a `script_path` parameter and executes it via `subprocess.run()` without any path containment validation. While `FileTools` has `_validate_path()` with traversal detection, `SkillTools` performs none. An LLM-directed call can execute arbitrary scripts from any filesystem location. The `@require_approval` decorator can be bypassed via YAML `approve:` for high-risk tools.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/skill_tools.py` (lines 69-119):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def run_skill_script(self, script_path: str, ...):
    script_path = os.path.expanduser(script_path)
    if not os.path.isabs(script_path):
        script_path = os.path.join(self._working_directory, script_path)
    script_path = os.path.abspath(script_path)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if not os.path.exists(script_path):
        return f&amp;#34;Error: Script not found at {script_path}&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# No path traversal check, no containment validation
    # Directly executes whatever is at that path:
    result = subprocess.run(cmd, ...)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;By contrast, `FileTools._validate_path()` (`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py`, lines 42-78) properly validates that the resolved path stays within the working directory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _validate_path(self, filepath: str) -&amp;gt; str:
    # ...
    cwd = os.path.abspath(os.getcwd())
    if os.path.commonpath([absolute, cwd]) != cwd:
        raise ValueError(f&amp;#34;Path traversal detected: {filepath} escapes workspace {cwd}&amp;#34;)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SkillTools` has…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c44f-37qr-gw3f</guid>
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