https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 21:49:49 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58226 <p>Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in elixir-mint hpax allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via unbounded HPACK integer decoding.</p> <p>hpax decodes HPACK variable-length integers with no upper bound on the decoded value or the number of continuation octets. &#39;Elixir.HPAX.Types&#39;:decode_remaining_integer/3 accumulates the integer as int + (value &lt;&lt;&lt; m), shifting by 7 more bits for each continuation octet and stopping only on a terminating octet or truncated input, never because the integer grew too large. Because BEAM integers are arbitrary precision, a run of N continuation octets builds an O(N)-bit bignum and re-adds into an ever-larger bignum on each step, so the total decoding cost is superlinear (about O(N^2)). An unauthenticated attacker who can send an HTTP/2 header block to a server using this decoder (reached through the &#39;Elixir.HPAX&#39;:decode/2 entry point) can supply a small header block that forces a large, attacker-controlled amount of CPU (and transient memory), a denial-of-service amplification.</p> <p>This issue affects hpax from 0.1.1 before 1.0.4.</p> <p>Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity vulnerability in elixir-mint hpax allows unauthenticated denial-of-service via unbounded HPACK integer decoding.</p> <p>hpax decodes HPACK variable-length integers with no upper bound on the decoded value or the number of continuation octets. &#39;Elixir.HPAX.Types&#39;:decode_remaining_integer/3 accumulates the integer as int + (value &lt;&lt;&lt; m), shifting by 7 more bits for each continuation octet and stopping only on a terminating octet or truncated input, never because the integer grew too large. Because BEAM integers are arbitrary precision, a run of N continuation octets builds an O(N)-bit bignum and re-adds into an ever-larger bignum on each step, so the total decoding cost is superlinear (about O(N^2)). An unauthenticated attacker who can send an HTTP/2 header block to a server using this decoder (reached through the &#39;Elixir.HPAX&#39;:decode/2 entry point) can supply a small header block that forces a large, attacker-controlled amount of CPU (and transient memory), a denial-of-service amplification.</p> <p>This issue affects hpax from 0.1.1 before 1.0.4.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58226