https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 06:14:26 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57178 <p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted. Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID. The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> <p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted. Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID. The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57178 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3c93-f73f-qc9h <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: social-auth-core</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>The `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted.</p> <p>Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID.</p> <p>The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>The issue has been fixed by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to a patched version.</p> <p>Fix:</p> <p>* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1811</p> <p>### Workarounds</p> <p>Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable the `vk-app` backend by removing `social_core.backends.vk.VKAppOAuth2` from `SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS`.</p> <p>There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable backend.</p> <p>### Credits</p> <p>Reported by @lalalala5678 through GitHub private vulnerability reporting.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: social-auth-core</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>The `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted.</p> <p>Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID.</p> <p>The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>The issue has been fixed by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> <p>Users should upgrade to a patched version.</p> <p>Fix:</p> <p>* https://github.com/python-social-auth/social-core/pull/1811</p> <p>### Workarounds</p> <p>Applications that cannot upgrade immediately should disable the `vk-app` backend by removing `social_core.backends.vk.VKAppOAuth2` from `SOCIAL_AUTH_AUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS`.</p> <p>There is no complete workaround while continuing to use the vulnerable backend.</p> <p>### Credits</p> <p>Reported by @lalalala5678 through GitHub private vulnerability reporting.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3c93-f73f-qc9h https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-57178 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python3.4, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python3.5, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python3.5, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.6, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.7, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.8, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python3.8 and 7 more</p> <p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted. Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID. The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python3.4, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python3.5, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python3.5, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python2.7, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.6, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.7, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python3.8, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python3.8 and 7 more</p> <p>Python Social Auth is a social authentication/registration mechanism. Prior to version 5.0.0, the `vk-app` backend accepted VK application callback data without verifying the callback signature when the `auth_key` parameter was omitted. Applications using this backend could treat unsigned attacker-controlled data as a verified VK identity. An attacker could choose callback fields such as `viewer_id`, `access_token`, `api_id`, and `api_result`, potentially allowing authentication as an arbitrary VK user ID. The issue affects only applications using the `vk-app` backend. The issue has been fixed in version 5.0.0 by requiring `auth_key` to be present and valid before callback data is trusted.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-57178