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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 04:08:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-57135</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57135</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts uses buildEnv() only to inject invalid http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables and does not establish an operating-system network boundary. Programs that ignore those proxy variables can open sockets directly, allowing supposedly isolated commands to reach localhost, internal services, cloud metadata, or external hosts and potentially exfiltrate data. An initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From 1.2.3 until 1.7.2, SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode in src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts uses buildEnv() only to inject invalid http_proxy and https_proxy environment variables and does not establish an operating-system network boundary. Programs that ignore those proxy variables can open sockets directly, allowing supposedly isolated commands to reach localhost, internal services, cloud metadata, or external hosts and potentially exfiltrate data. An initial remediation was released in version 1.7.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-57135</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gqmf-56h7-rrpf — npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor network-isolated mode does not block non-proxy-aware network clients</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gqmf-56h7-rrpf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The published npm package `praisonai` exports a TypeScript `SandboxExecutor` with a `network-isolated` mode. The CLI lists that mode as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
network-isolated  No network access (proxy blocked)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The implementation does not create a network namespace, firewall rule, socket filter, or proxy-enforced execution boundary. It only injects proxy environment variables into the child process:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
http_proxy: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
https_proxy: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
HTTP_PROXY: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
HTTPS_PROXY: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
no_proxy: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;,
NO_PROXY: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clients that do not explicitly honor those proxy variables continue to use the host network stack. A local-only PoV shows that, inside `mode: &amp;#34;network-isolated&amp;#34;`, a proxy-aware Node invocation is stopped, while a plain Node HTTP client reaches a loopback HTTP server from the same sandboxed command environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a network-isolation protection failure in an exported npm API and CLI mode. It is not a generic claim that every PraisonAI sandbox backend is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts` declares the mode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
export type SandboxMode = &amp;#39;disabled&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;basic&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;strict&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;network-isolated&amp;#39;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SandboxExecutor.spawn()` starts the command through the host shell and passes only the environment returned by `buildEnv()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const proc = spawn(&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;, [&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;, command], {
  cwd: this.config.cwd,
  env,
  timeout: this.config.timeout,
  stdio: [&amp;#39;p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The published npm package `praisonai` exports a TypeScript `SandboxExecutor` with a `network-isolated` mode. The CLI lists that mode as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```text
network-isolated  No network access (proxy blocked)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The implementation does not create a network namespace, firewall rule, socket filter, or proxy-enforced execution boundary. It only injects proxy environment variables into the child process:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
http_proxy: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
https_proxy: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
HTTP_PROXY: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
HTTPS_PROXY: &amp;#39;http://localhost:0&amp;#39;,
no_proxy: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;,
NO_PROXY: &amp;#39;&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clients that do not explicitly honor those proxy variables continue to use the host network stack. A local-only PoV shows that, inside `mode: &amp;#34;network-isolated&amp;#34;`, a proxy-aware Node invocation is stopped, while a plain Node HTTP client reaches a loopback HTTP server from the same sandboxed command environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a network-isolation protection failure in an exported npm API and CLI mode. It is not a generic claim that every PraisonAI sandbox backend is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts` declares the mode:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
export type SandboxMode = &amp;#39;disabled&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;basic&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;strict&amp;#39; | &amp;#39;network-isolated&amp;#39;;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`SandboxExecutor.spawn()` starts the command through the host shell and passes only the environment returned by `buildEnv()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
const proc = spawn(&amp;#39;sh&amp;#39;, [&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;, command], {
  cwd: this.config.cwd,
  env,
  timeout: this.config.timeout,
  stdio: [&amp;#39;p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gqmf-56h7-rrpf</guid>
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