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fkie_cve-2026-55825

Contao is an Open Source CMS. In versions 5.7.0 through 5.7.6, an authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing ../ segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside var/job-attachments. The controller authorizes only the jobUuid route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled identifier, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. VirtualFilesystem::resolve() canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv becomes victim-job/debug_log.csv. This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.

GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5 — Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs

Affected: Packagist: contao/contao, Packagist: contao/core-bundle

## Summary

An authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.

The controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.

This is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.

## Root Cause

`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:

```php $job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);

if (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) { throw $this->createNotFoundException(); }

$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier); ```

`Jobs::getAttachment()` then resolves a path built from the authorized job UUID and the attacker-controlled identifier:

```php $fileItem = $this->jobAttachmentsStorage->get($this->getAttachmentIdentifier($job, $identifier)); ```

```php return $job->getUuid().'/'.$identifier; ```

`VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canoni…

WID-SEC-W-2026-1921 — Contao: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Offenlegung von Informationen

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Contao ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen.