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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54662</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54662</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;swagger-typescript-api generates API clients for Fetch or Axios from OpenAPI specifications. Prior to 13.12.2, src/code-gen-process.ts createApiConfig copies servers[0].url into apiConfig.baseUrl, and templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs interpolates apiConfig.baseUrl into the generated HttpClient baseUrl field without escaping, allowing an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec to inject TypeScript static field code that executes when the generated fetch client module is imported. This issue is fixed in version 13.12.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;swagger-typescript-api generates API clients for Fetch or Axios from OpenAPI specifications. Prior to 13.12.2, src/code-gen-process.ts createApiConfig copies servers[0].url into apiConfig.baseUrl, and templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs interpolates apiConfig.baseUrl into the generated HttpClient baseUrl field without escaping, allowing an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec to inject TypeScript static field code that executes when the generated fetch client module is imported. This issue is fixed in version 13.12.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54662</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hqj5-cw9f-rx67 — swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped `servers[0].url` in fetch http-client template</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hqj5-cw9f-rx67</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: swagger-typescript-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `servers[0].url` directly into a TypeScript class-body field initializer of the generated **fetch** `HttpClient` (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a `&amp;#34;` closes the string literal that initializes `public baseUrl` and exposes the surrounding *class body* to injection. The most direct exploit declares a new `static` field whose initializer is an async IIFE — TypeScript evaluates static field initializers at **class definition time**, which is at module load. A consumer who imports the generated client (or anything that transitively imports it) executes the injected code with no further interaction — no instantiation, no method call, no use of the baseUrl. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is whoever runs the generator and imports the result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the highest-impact sink in the package: the trigger requires only a bare `import` of the generated module.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`createApiConfig` in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` sets the templated `baseUrl` from the spec without sanitization:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
return {
  ...
  baseUrl: serverUrl,     // &amp;lt;-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw
  ...
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fetch http-client template (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal that initializes a public class-body field of the generated `HttpClient`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ejs
export class HttpClient…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: swagger-typescript-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `servers[0].url` directly into a TypeScript class-body field initializer of the generated **fetch** `HttpClient` (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a `&amp;#34;` closes the string literal that initializes `public baseUrl` and exposes the surrounding *class body* to injection. The most direct exploit declares a new `static` field whose initializer is an async IIFE — TypeScript evaluates static field initializers at **class definition time**, which is at module load. A consumer who imports the generated client (or anything that transitively imports it) executes the injected code with no further interaction — no instantiation, no method call, no use of the baseUrl. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is whoever runs the generator and imports the result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the highest-impact sink in the package: the trigger requires only a bare `import` of the generated module.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`createApiConfig` in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` sets the templated `baseUrl` from the spec without sanitization:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
return {
  ...
  baseUrl: serverUrl,     // &amp;lt;-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw
  ...
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fetch http-client template (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal that initializes a public class-body field of the generated `HttpClient`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ejs
export class HttpClient…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hqj5-cw9f-rx67</guid>
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