https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:10:11 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54071 <p>BabelDOC is a document translation tool. Prior to 0.6.3, BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py deserializes untrusted pickle data when CMapDB._load_data() loads CMap files. PDF-controlled Encoding or CMapName values and embedded PostScript usecmap operators can reach this sink after path separators are decoded, while _normalize_cmap_name() removes only a leading slash. Absolute paths or traversal sequences can escape the trusted CMap directories through os.path.join(), select an attacker-writable .pickle.gz file, and cause pickle.loads() to execute arbitrary Python code with the privileges of the BabelDOC process. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.3.</p> <p>BabelDOC is a document translation tool. Prior to 0.6.3, BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py deserializes untrusted pickle data when CMapDB._load_data() loads CMap files. PDF-controlled Encoding or CMapName values and embedded PostScript usecmap operators can reach this sink after path separators are decoded, while _normalize_cmap_name() removes only a leading slash. Absolute paths or traversal sequences can escape the trusted CMap directories through os.path.join(), select an attacker-writable .pickle.gz file, and cause pickle.loads() to execute arbitrary Python code with the privileges of the BabelDOC process. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.3.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54071 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m8gf-v64p-gfmg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: BabelDOC</p> <p>## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python&#39;s `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF&#39;s `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`:</p> <p>```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -&gt; Any: name = name.replace(&#34;\0&#34;, &#34;&#34;) # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = &#34;%s.pickle.gz&#34; % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ```</p> <p>**Path injection via…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: BabelDOC</p> <p>## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python&#39;s `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF&#39;s `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`:</p> <p>```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -&gt; Any: name = name.replace(&#34;\0&#34;, &#34;&#34;) # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = &#34;%s.pickle.gz&#34; % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ```</p> <p>**Path injection via…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-m8gf-v64p-gfmg https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2389 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: babeldoc</p> <p>## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python&#39;s `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF&#39;s `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`:</p> <p>```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -&gt; Any: name = name.replace(&#34;\0&#34;, &#34;&#34;) # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = &#34;%s.pickle.gz&#34; % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ```</p> <p>**Path injection via…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: babeldoc</p> <p>## Arbitrary Code Execution via CMap Pickle Deserialization in babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>BabelDOC&#39;s vendored PDF parser (`babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py`) deserializes untrusted pickle data when loading CMap files. The `_load_data()` method strips only NUL bytes from a PDF-controlled CMap name, then passes it directly to `os.path.join()` and `pickle.loads()`. Because Python&#39;s `os.path.join()` discards all preceding path components when it encounters an absolute path segment, an attacker who embeds a hex-encoded absolute path in a crafted PDF&#39;s `/Encoding` name (e.g., `/#2Ftmp#2Fattacker#2Fevil`) can redirect deserialization to any attacker-writable `.pickle.gz` file on the local system. Processing such a PDF results in arbitrary Python code execution with the privileges of the BabelDOC process.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable function is `CMapDB._load_data()` at `babeldoc/pdfminer/cmapdb.py:232–245`:</p> <p>```python @classmethod def _load_data(cls, name: str) -&gt; Any: name = name.replace(&#34;\0&#34;, &#34;&#34;) # line 233 — only NUL is stripped filename = &#34;%s.pickle.gz&#34; % name # line 234 — attacker-controlled string ... for directory in cmap_paths: path = os.path.join(directory, filename) # line 241 — no realpath/canonical check if os.path.exists(path): gzfile = gzip.open(path) try: return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read())) # line 245 — unconditional pickle ```</p> <p>**Path injection via…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2389