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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:19:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2026-09720</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-09720</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-09720</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-09720</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-54008</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54008</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54008</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-226f-f24g-524w — Open WebUI: Redirect-Bypass SSRF in OAuth `_process_picture_url` (incomplete-fix sibling of CVE-2026-45401)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-226f-f24g-524w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url` (v0.9.5, lines 1435-1470) calls `validate_url(picture_url)` on the initial URL only, then invokes `aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...)` without `allow_redirects=False`. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is `allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10`; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s `AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS` env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own `profile_image_url` field.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same redirect-bypass class as CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6), on a 6th call site that the v0.9.5 patch missed. CVE-2026-45401&amp;#39;s advisory body enumerates exactly five affected paths â€” `SafeWebBaseLoader._scrape`, `_fetch`, `get_content_from_url`, `load_url_image`, `get_image_base64_from_url` â€” none in `utils/oauth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code (v0.9.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py`, lines 1435-1470:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&amp;gt; str:
    if not picture_url:
        return &amp;#39;/user.png&amp;#39;
    try:
        validate_url(picture_url)                              # initial URL only&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_kwargs = {}
        if access_token:
            get_kwargs[&amp;#39;headers&amp;#39;] = {&amp;#39;Authorization&amp;#39;: f&amp;#39;Bearer {access_token}&amp;#39;}
        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
            async wi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url` (v0.9.5, lines 1435-1470) calls `validate_url(picture_url)` on the initial URL only, then invokes `aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...)` without `allow_redirects=False`. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is `allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10`; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s `AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS` env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own `profile_image_url` field.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same redirect-bypass class as CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6), on a 6th call site that the v0.9.5 patch missed. CVE-2026-45401&amp;#39;s advisory body enumerates exactly five affected paths â€” `SafeWebBaseLoader._scrape`, `_fetch`, `get_content_from_url`, `load_url_image`, `get_image_base64_from_url` â€” none in `utils/oauth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code (v0.9.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py`, lines 1435-1470:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&amp;gt; str:
    if not picture_url:
        return &amp;#39;/user.png&amp;#39;
    try:
        validate_url(picture_url)                              # initial URL only&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_kwargs = {}
        if access_token:
            get_kwargs[&amp;#39;headers&amp;#39;] = {&amp;#39;Authorization&amp;#39;: f&amp;#39;Bearer {access_token}&amp;#39;}
        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
            async wi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-226f-f24g-524w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2690 — Open WebUI: Redirect-Bypass SSRF in OAuth `_process_picture_url` (incomplete-fix sibling of CVE-2026-45401)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2690</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url` (v0.9.5, lines 1435-1470) calls `validate_url(picture_url)` on the initial URL only, then invokes `aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...)` without `allow_redirects=False`. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is `allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10`; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s `AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS` env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own `profile_image_url` field.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same redirect-bypass class as CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6), on a 6th call site that the v0.9.5 patch missed. CVE-2026-45401&amp;#39;s advisory body enumerates exactly five affected paths â€” `SafeWebBaseLoader._scrape`, `_fetch`, `get_content_from_url`, `load_url_image`, `get_image_base64_from_url` â€” none in `utils/oauth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code (v0.9.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py`, lines 1435-1470:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&amp;gt; str:
    if not picture_url:
        return &amp;#39;/user.png&amp;#39;
    try:
        validate_url(picture_url)                              # initial URL only&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_kwargs = {}
        if access_token:
            get_kwargs[&amp;#39;headers&amp;#39;] = {&amp;#39;Authorization&amp;#39;: f&amp;#39;Bearer {access_token}&amp;#39;}
        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
            async wi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url` (v0.9.5, lines 1435-1470) calls `validate_url(picture_url)` on the initial URL only, then invokes `aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...)` without `allow_redirects=False`. aiohttp&amp;#39;s default is `allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10`; the function does not pass the project&amp;#39;s `AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS` env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker&amp;#39;s own `profile_image_url` field.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same redirect-bypass class as CVE-2026-45401 (GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6), on a 6th call site that the v0.9.5 patch missed. CVE-2026-45401&amp;#39;s advisory body enumerates exactly five affected paths â€” `SafeWebBaseLoader._scrape`, `_fetch`, `get_content_from_url`, `load_url_image`, `get_image_base64_from_url` â€” none in `utils/oauth.py`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerable code (v0.9.5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py`, lines 1435-1470:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -&amp;gt; str:
    if not picture_url:
        return &amp;#39;/user.png&amp;#39;
    try:
        validate_url(picture_url)                              # initial URL only&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_kwargs = {}
        if access_token:
            get_kwargs[&amp;#39;headers&amp;#39;] = {&amp;#39;Authorization&amp;#39;: f&amp;#39;Bearer {access_token}&amp;#39;}
        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
            async wi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2690</guid>
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