https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:53:27 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47413 <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47413 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38. **Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {&#34;owner&#34;, &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;member&#34;}` — the value, not the caller&#39;s right to assign it. The route&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.</p> <p>```python @router.post(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members&#34;, response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def add_member( workspace_id: str, body: MemberAdd, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_memb…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38. **Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {&#34;owner&#34;, &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;member&#34;}` — the value, not the caller&#39;s right to assign it. The route&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.</p> <p>```python @router.post(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members&#34;, response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def add_member( workspace_id: str, body: MemberAdd, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_memb…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-480 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38. **Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {&#34;owner&#34;, &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;member&#34;}` — the value, not the caller&#39;s right to assign it. The route&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.</p> <p>```python @router.post(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members&#34;, response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def add_member( workspace_id: str, body: MemberAdd, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_memb…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`) and forwards the request body&#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38. **Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {&#34;owner&#34;, &#34;admin&#34;, &#34;member&#34;}` — the value, not the caller&#39;s right to assign it. The route&#39;s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=&#34;member&#34;`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.</p> <p>```python @router.post(&#34;/{workspace_id}/members&#34;, response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def add_member( workspace_id: str, body: MemberAdd, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_memb…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-480