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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44359</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44359</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository&amp;#39;s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker&amp;#39;s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: &amp;#34;NONE&amp;#34; triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository&amp;#39;s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker&amp;#39;s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: &amp;#34;NONE&amp;#34; triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44359</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-44359</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44359</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: meshtastic&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository&amp;#39;s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker&amp;#39;s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: &amp;#34;NONE&amp;#34; triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: meshtastic&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. Prior to version 2.7.21.1370b23, the Meshtastic GitHub repository&amp;#39;s main_matrix.yml workflow is triggered by pull_request_target  and multiple jobs check out the attacker&amp;#39;s fork code and execute it with access to repository secrets and elevated GITHUB_TOKEN permissions. No approval gate exists. Pull requests from external users with author_association: &amp;#34;NONE&amp;#34; triggered the CI workflow automatically. The workflow directly executes attacker-controlled files from the fork checkout. This issue could have resulted in supply chain compromise, self-hosted runner compromise, and/or repository takeover for the repo. This issue is separate from GHSA-6mwm-v2vv-pp96, which addressed a command injection via github.head_ref in the setup job of the same workflow. That fix correctly moved to environment variables. However, the more critical fork checkout vulnerability across the check, build, and build-debian-src jobs was not addressed. Version 2.7.21.1370b23 contains a patch for thie issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-44359</guid>
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