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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-35345</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35345</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35345</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-xf75-659h-cgg5 — uutils coreutils has a Link Following Issue</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xf75-659h-cgg5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreutils&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: coreutils&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xf75-659h-cgg5</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-35345</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-35345</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-coreutils, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-coreutils, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-coreutils&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-coreutils, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-coreutils, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-coreutils&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link&amp;#39;s target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-35345</guid>
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