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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-21862</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-21862</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to version alpha.78, IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies. This issue has been patched in version alpha.78.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;RustFS is a distributed object storage system built in Rust. Prior to version alpha.78, IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies. This issue has been patched in version alpha.78.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-21862</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq — RustFS has SourceIp bypass via spoofed X-Forwarded-For/Real-IP headers</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Vulnerable code: `rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304` sets `remote_addr` from `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-Ip`, then inserts `SourceIp` via
    `get_source_ip_raw`, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:
      - `let remote_addr = header.get(&amp;#34;x-forwarded-for&amp;#34;).and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get(&amp;#34;x-real-ip&amp;#34;)...).unwrap_or(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;);`
      - `args.insert(&amp;#34;SourceIp&amp;#34;, vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);`
  - This value feeds IAM/bucket policy evaluation in `rustfs/src/storage/access.rs` (authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meet `aws:SourceIp` conditions.
  - No authentication is required beyond the request itself; the header is taken at face value even on direct connections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24038162/rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Steps (already included in `rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Start RustFS with two local volumes, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
     mkdir -p /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
     RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=devadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=devadmin \
       cargo run --bin rustfs -- --address 0.0.0.0:9000 \
       /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. From `…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: rustfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Vulnerable code: `rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304` sets `remote_addr` from `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-Ip`, then inserts `SourceIp` via
    `get_source_ip_raw`, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:
      - `let remote_addr = header.get(&amp;#34;x-forwarded-for&amp;#34;).and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get(&amp;#34;x-real-ip&amp;#34;)...).unwrap_or(&amp;#34;127.0.0.1&amp;#34;);`
      - `args.insert(&amp;#34;SourceIp&amp;#34;, vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);`
  - This value feeds IAM/bucket policy evaluation in `rustfs/src/storage/access.rs` (authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meet `aws:SourceIp` conditions.
  - No authentication is required beyond the request itself; the header is taken at face value even on direct connections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24038162/rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Steps (already included in `rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/`):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Start RustFS with two local volumes, e.g.:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
     mkdir -p /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
     RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=devadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=devadmin \
       cargo run --bin rustfs -- --address 0.0.0.0:9000 \
       /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. From `…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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