https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 11 Oct 2026 21:40:36 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108258 <p>Shiny for Python is a framework for building interactive web applications in Python. From 1.4.0 until 1.6.4, bookmark restore accepts a client-supplied state_id and joins it into the server-side shiny_bookmarks directory without validating that it is a single safe path segment. An unauthenticated request can use parent-directory segments or an absolute path to make the server open input.json and values.json outside the bookmark store, even when bookmark_store is set to disable. In applications configured with bookmark_store set to server and using ui.input_file(), the restore handler can additionally copy and expose an attacker-selected file from an attacker-selected directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.4.</p> <p>Shiny for Python is a framework for building interactive web applications in Python. From 1.4.0 until 1.6.4, bookmark restore accepts a client-supplied state_id and joins it into the server-side shiny_bookmarks directory without validating that it is a single safe path segment. An unauthenticated request can use parent-directory segments or an absolute path to make the server open input.json and values.json outside the bookmark store, even when bookmark_store is set to disable. In applications configured with bookmark_store set to server and using ui.input_file(), the restore handler can additionally copy and expose an attacker-selected file from an attacker-selected directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.4.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108258 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47c3-hpmg-7j6p <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: shiny</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Shiny for Python&#39;s bookmark-restore path accepted a client-supplied `_state_id_` query-string value and joined it into the server-side bookmark directory (`&lt;cwd&gt;/shiny_bookmarks/&lt;id&gt;`) without validating it. A value containing `..` path segments, or an absolute path, could therefore cause the server to open and parse `input.json` and `values.json` from a directory outside the bookmark store.</p> <p>On a default application the restore was attempted whenever the client supplied a URL query string — including when bookmarking was disabled (`bookmark_store=&#34;disable&#34;`) — so no opt-in configuration was required. For such applications the impact is an unauthenticated, server-side probe for the existence and JSON-validity of attacker-chosen paths, constrained to those two file names.</p> <p>Applications configured with `bookmark_store=&#34;server&#34;` **and** using `ui.input_file()` are affected more seriously. The file-input restore handler copies files out of the restore directory, so the contents of an attacker-selected file name within an attacker-selected directory could be read into the application.</p> <p>### Affected versions</p> <p>1.4.0 through 1.6.3. Bookmarking was introduced in 1.4.0; earlier releases do not contain the affected code path and are not affected.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>Fixed in **1.6.4**. Upgrade with:</p> <p>``` pip install --upgrade shiny ```</p> <p>The fix validates bookmark IDs against an allowlist — a single path segment matching `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`, which cannot express a path separator, a `…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: shiny</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Shiny for Python&#39;s bookmark-restore path accepted a client-supplied `_state_id_` query-string value and joined it into the server-side bookmark directory (`&lt;cwd&gt;/shiny_bookmarks/&lt;id&gt;`) without validating it. A value containing `..` path segments, or an absolute path, could therefore cause the server to open and parse `input.json` and `values.json` from a directory outside the bookmark store.</p> <p>On a default application the restore was attempted whenever the client supplied a URL query string — including when bookmarking was disabled (`bookmark_store=&#34;disable&#34;`) — so no opt-in configuration was required. For such applications the impact is an unauthenticated, server-side probe for the existence and JSON-validity of attacker-chosen paths, constrained to those two file names.</p> <p>Applications configured with `bookmark_store=&#34;server&#34;` **and** using `ui.input_file()` are affected more seriously. The file-input restore handler copies files out of the restore directory, so the contents of an attacker-selected file name within an attacker-selected directory could be read into the application.</p> <p>### Affected versions</p> <p>1.4.0 through 1.6.3. Bookmarking was introduced in 1.4.0; earlier releases do not contain the affected code path and are not affected.</p> <p>### Patches</p> <p>Fixed in **1.6.4**. Upgrade with:</p> <p>``` pip install --upgrade shiny ```</p> <p>The fix validates bookmark IDs against an allowlist — a single path segment matching `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`, which cannot express a path separator, a `…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47c3-hpmg-7j6p