<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:44:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-10669</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10669</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On Xtensa SoCs built with CONFIG_XTENSA_MPU and CONFIG_USERSPACE, arch_buffer_validate() in arch/xtensa/core/mpu.c — the architecture hook that verifies a user-mode-supplied buffer is accessible to the calling user thread with the requested permission — defaulted its return value to 0 (access permitted) and only set a denial result inside its per-MPU-region probe loop. When the rounded extent of the buffer wraps the 32-bit address space (size + alignment offset near SIZE_MAX, or ROUND_UP(size + offset) overflowing to 0), the loop executes zero iterations and the function returns 0 = permitted without probing any MPU region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The syscall-layer pre-checks (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_SIZE_CHECK / Z_DETECT_POINTER_OVERFLOW) only catch a raw addr+size wrap and do not cover the ROUND_UP-induced wrap, and the string path (arch_user_string_nlen -&amp;gt; arch_buffer_validate) has no syscall-layer guard at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore pass a crafted (addr, size) to any syscall that validates user buffers via k_usermode_from_copy/to_copy or k_usermode_string_copy and have validation succeed for memory it must not access; the kernel then reads from (disclosure) or, with write=1, writes to (corruption) attacker-chosen kernel or other-partition memory on the thread&amp;#39;s behalf, enabling information disclosure, memory corruption, privilege escalation, and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected from v3.7.0 (when Xtensa MPU userspace support was added) through v4.4.0. The fix changes the default…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;On Xtensa SoCs built with CONFIG_XTENSA_MPU and CONFIG_USERSPACE, arch_buffer_validate() in arch/xtensa/core/mpu.c — the architecture hook that verifies a user-mode-supplied buffer is accessible to the calling user thread with the requested permission — defaulted its return value to 0 (access permitted) and only set a denial result inside its per-MPU-region probe loop. When the rounded extent of the buffer wraps the 32-bit address space (size + alignment offset near SIZE_MAX, or ROUND_UP(size + offset) overflowing to 0), the loop executes zero iterations and the function returns 0 = permitted without probing any MPU region.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The syscall-layer pre-checks (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_SIZE_CHECK / Z_DETECT_POINTER_OVERFLOW) only catch a raw addr+size wrap and do not cover the ROUND_UP-induced wrap, and the string path (arch_user_string_nlen -&amp;gt; arch_buffer_validate) has no syscall-layer guard at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore pass a crafted (addr, size) to any syscall that validates user buffers via k_usermode_from_copy/to_copy or k_usermode_string_copy and have validation succeed for memory it must not access; the kernel then reads from (disclosure) or, with write=1, writes to (corruption) attacker-chosen kernel or other-partition memory on the thread&amp;#39;s behalf, enabling information disclosure, memory corruption, privilege escalation, and denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected from v3.7.0 (when Xtensa MPU userspace support was added) through v4.4.0. The fix changes the default…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10669</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
