https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:49:26 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10582 <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10582 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wg2f-v5x6-m39r <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wg2f-v5x6-m39r https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:66266 <p>hugo: github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) leading to information disclosure. github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via unescaped code-fence attribute values golang.org/x/image: golang.org/x/image: Denial of Service due to excessive memory allocation when parsing malicious font files github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Arbitrary file read via symbolic link sandbox escape github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Stored cross-site scripting via unescaped lineAnchors option github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Information disclosure via symlinked mount roots github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Security restriction bypass via mixed-case URL schemes github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Cross-site scripting via unescaped HTML in Org Mode content</p> <p>hugo: github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) leading to information disclosure. github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via unescaped code-fence attribute values golang.org/x/image: golang.org/x/image: Denial of Service due to excessive memory allocation when parsing malicious font files github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Arbitrary file read via symbolic link sandbox escape github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Stored cross-site scripting via unescaped lineAnchors option github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Information disclosure via symlinked mount roots github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Security restriction bypass via mixed-case URL schemes github.com/gohugoio/hugo: Hugo: Cross-site scripting via unescaped HTML in Org Mode content</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:66266 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10582 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: hugo</p> <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: hugo, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: hugo</p> <p>Hugo&#39;s security.http.urls allowlist is the only control on outbound fetches made by resources.GetRemote, and it inspects the URL text alone. CheckAllowedHTTPURL in config/security/securityConfig.go applies the configured pattern list and then re-checks a canonicalised form of an integer, hex or octal IPv4 host, but it never resolves the hostname and never inspects the address the HTTP client actually connects to. The client constructed in resources/resource_factories/create/create.go installs no dial-time hook, so no check occurs at connection time either. A hostname that resolves to a loopback, private or cloud-metadata address therefore satisfies the policy, and the response body is embedded in the generated site. An attacker who can supply a URL through content, for example a front-matter field or a CMS field, can make the build fetch an internal endpoint and publish the response in the static output, so the build artifact itself carries the data out.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10582