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CERTFR-2025-AVI-0252 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…

CERTFR-2025-AVI-0252

bdu:2025-10585

fkie_cve-2022-49236

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module

While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference when module initcall is happening in parallel.

Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked. The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF.

However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e. its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE.

This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't regress…

GHSA-m3vm-45hm-666q

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module

RHSA-2023:2458 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update

hw: cpu: AMD CPUs may transiently execute beyond unconditional direct branch kernel: ext4: kernel bug in ext4_write_inline_data_end() kernel: malicious data for FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl may cause OOB write memory kernel: hwmon: (mlxreg-fan) Return non-zero value when fan current state is enforced from sysfs kernel: mlxsw: thermal: Fix out-of-bounds memory accesses kernel: mlxsw: spectrum: Protect driver from buggy firmware kernel: net: stmmac: fix tc flower deletion for VLAN priority Rx steering kernel: can: etas_es58x: es58x_rx_err_msg(): fix memory leak in error path kernel: possible race condition in drivers/tty/tty_buffers.c kernel: KVM: NULL pointer dereference in kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva kernel: use-after-free in free_pipe_info() could lead to privilege escalation kernel: KVM: nVMX: missing IBPB when exiting from nested guest can lead to Spectre v2 attacks kernel: netfilter: nf_conntrack_irc message handling issue kernel: race condition in xfrm_probe_algs can lead to OOB read/write kernel: out-of-bounds read in fib_nh_match of the file net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c kernel: race condition in hugetlb_no_page() in mm/hugetlb.c kernel: memory leak in ipv6_renew_options() kernel: data races around icsk->icsk_af_ops in do_ipv6_setsockopt kernel: data races around sk->sk_prot kernel: memory leak in l2cap_recv_acldata of the file net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c kernel: denial of service in follow_page_pte in mm/gup.c due to poisoned pte entry kernel: use-after-free after failed devlink relo…

SUSE-SU-2025:1027-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

UBUNTU-CVE-2022-49236

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 85 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference when module initcall is happening in parallel. Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked. The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF. However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e. its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE. This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't regress in th…