<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T13:41:01.763175+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72183</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-72183 — landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T13:41:01.813396+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>landlock: Fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass on the SIGIO path</p>
<p>LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL must prevent a sandboxed process from signaling
processes outside its Landlock domain.  It can be bypassed through the
asynchronous SIGIO delivery path.</p>
<p>A sandboxed process that owns any file or socket can arm it with
fcntl(fd, F_SETOWN, -pgid), fcntl(fd, F_SETSIG, SIGKILL) and O_ASYNC, so
that an I/O event makes the kernel deliver the chosen signal to the
whole process group.  As the head of its process group's task list (the
default position right after fork()) that group can also hold the
non-sandboxed process that launched it, e.g. a supervisor or a security
monitor.  The sandbox can thus kill or signal the processes
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL is meant to protect from it.</p>
<p>The scope is enforced in hook_file_send_sigiotask() against the Landlock
domain recorded at F_SETOWN time, not the live domain of the sender.
control_current_fowner() decides whether to record that domain and skips
recording it when the fowner target is in the caller's thread group,
which is safe only for a single-task target (PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID).
For a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID) pid_task() returns only one member;
recording is skipped whenever that member shares the caller's thread
group, and hook_file_send_sigiotask() then lets the signal fan out to
the whole group unchecked.</p>
<p>Record the domain for every non single-process target so the scope is…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72183"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/usn-8887-1</id>
    <title>USN-8887-1 — linux, linux-aws, linux-gcp, linux-gke, linux-ibm, linux-oracle, linux-realtime vulnerabilities</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T13:41:01.813541+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-gke, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-ibm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-realtime</p>
<p>It was discovered that some AMD processors did not properly perform Reverse
Map Table (RMP) checks when the IOMMU accessed certain host buffers. A
local attacker with hypervisor access could possibly use this to trigger an
out-of-bounds condition and compromise the integrity of SEV-SNP guest
memory. (CVE-2023-20585)</p>
<p>Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - NVDIMM (Non-Volatile Memory Device) drivers;
  - Handshake API;
  - ARM32 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - OpenRISC architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - x86 architecture;
  - Cryptographic API;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - Intel NPU Driver;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Android drivers;
  - Serial ATA and Parallel ATA drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - Rados block device (RBD) driver;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Cdrom driver;
  - Character device driver;
  - TPM device driver;
  - Data acquisition framework and drivers;
  - Hardware crypto device drivers;
  - CXL (Compute Express Link) drivers;
  - DAX dirext access to differentiated memory framework;
  - DIBS (Direct Internal Buffer Sharing) drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DMA engine subsystem;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - FireWire subsystem;
  - Arm Firmware Framework fo…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/usn-8887-1"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
