An issue was discovered in OpenLDAP 2.x before 2.4.48. When using SASL authentication and session encryption, and relying on the SASL security layers in slapd access controls, it is possible to obtain access that would otherwise be denied via a simple bind for any identity covered in those ACLs. After the first SASL bind is completed, the sasl_ssf value is retained for all new non-SASL connections. Depending on the ACL configuration, this can affect different types of operations (searches, modifications, etc.). In other words, a successful authorization step completed by one user affects the authorization requirement for a different user.

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: openldap, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: openldap

It was discovered that OpenLDAP incorrectly handled rootDN delegation. A database administrator could use this issue to request authorization as an identity from another database, contrary to expectations. (CVE-2019-13057)

It was discovered that OpenLDAP incorrectly handled SASL authentication and session encryption. After a first SASL bind was completed, it was possible to obtain access by performing simple binds, contrary to expectations. (CVE-2019-13565)