https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-28T14:39:24.116192+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47708 CVE-2026-47708 — MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper 2026-09-28T14:39:24.146224+00:00

Affected: SepineTam stata-mcp

MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4p62-hqp5-g644 GHSA-4p62-hqp5-g644 — MCP-for-Stata: Command injection via log_file_name parameter in Stata command wrapper 2026-09-28T14:39:24.146359+00:00

Affected: PyPI: stata-mcp

### Summary The `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.

### Details

In `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:

```python commands = f""" capture log close {self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)} ... do "{dofile_path}" ... """ ```

The `generate_log_command` method returns:

```python log_cmd = f'log using "{log_file.as_posix()}", {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)' ```

Where `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:

```python def generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension='log'): return self.log_file_path / f"{log_name}.{extension}" ```

The `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.

Additionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside…