https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-08T19:07:58.970480+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-67720 CVE-2025-67720 — Pyrofork has a Path Traversal in download_media Method 2026-10-08T19:07:59.242246+00:00

Affected: Mayuri-Chan pyrofork

Pyrofork is a modern, asynchronous MTProto API framework. Versions 2.3.68 and earlier do not properly sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages in the download_media method before using them in file path construction. When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the file_name attribute from the media object. The attribute originates from Telegram's DocumentAttributeFilename and is controlled by the message sender. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.69.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6h2f-wjhf-4wjx GHSA-6h2f-wjhf-4wjx — Pyrofork has a Path Traversal in download_media Method 2026-10-08T19:07:59.242383+00:00

Affected: PyPI: pyrofork

## Summary

The `download_media` method in Pyrofork does not sanitize filenames received from Telegram messages before using them in file path construction. This allows a remote attacker to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem by sending a specially crafted document with path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`) or absolute paths in the filename.

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## Details

When downloading media, if the user does not specify a custom filename (which is the common/default usage), the method falls back to using the `file_name` attribute from the media object. This attribute originates from Telegram's `DocumentAttributeFilename` and is controlled by the message sender.

### Vulnerable Code Path

**Step 1**: In `pyrogram/methods/messages/download_media.py` (lines 145-151):

```python media_file_name = getattr(media, "file_name", "") # Value from Telegram message

directory, file_name = os.path.split(file_name) # Split user's path parameter file_name = file_name or media_file_name or "" # Falls back to media_file_name if empty ```

When a user calls `download_media(message)` or `download_media(message, "downloads/")`, the `os.path.split()` returns an empty filename, causing the code to use `media_file_name` which is attacker-controlled.

**Step 2**: In `pyrogram/client.py` (line 1125):

```python temp_file_path = os.path.abspath(re.sub("\\\\", "/", os.path.join(directory, file_name))) + ".temp" ```

The `os.path.join()` function does not prevent path traversal. When `…