Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

## Summary This advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.

## Deployment Context OpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.

## What Changed - Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes. - Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access. - Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.

## Impact Risk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.

## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Vulnerable: `<= 2026.2.19-2` - Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)

## Fix Commit(s) - `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1` - `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`

Thanks @NucleiAv for reporting.