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  <updated>2026-10-01T22:27:47.269768+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-91129</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-91129 — Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T22:27:47.294755+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> home-assistant core</p>
<p>Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-91129"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-4051</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-4051 — Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T22:27:47.294892+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: homeassistant</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Home Assistant Green is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the mDNS/Zeroconf IPP integration. An unauthenticated attacker on the local network can send a crafted mDNS response to trick Home Assistant into making HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts, including internal services bound to localhost. The IPP integration automatically processes `_ipp._tcp.local` service announcements without any user interaction or authentication, and follows HTTP redirects from the attacker-controlled host.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>Home Assistant listens for mDNS service announcements on port 5353. When a service of type `_ipp._tcp.local` is discovered, the IPP integration's zeroconf handler (`homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py`) processes it automatically.</p>
<p>The `async_step_zeroconf` method extracts `host`, `port`, and `base_path` directly from the mDNS discovery info without validation:</p>
<p>```python
async def async_step_zeroconf(
    self, discovery_info: ZeroconfServiceInfo
) -&gt; ConfigFlowResult:
    host = discovery_info.host
    port = discovery_info.port
    zctype = discovery_info.type
    name = discovery_info.name.replace(f".{zctype}", "")
    tls = zctype == "_ipps._tcp.local."
    base_path = discovery_info.properties.get("rp", "ipp/print")</p>
<p>self.discovery_info.update(
        {
            CONF_HOST: host,
            CONF_PORT: port,
            CONF_SSL: tls,
            CONF_VERIFY_SSL: False,
            CONF_BASE_PATH: f"/{base_path}",
            CONF_…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-4051"/>
  </entry>
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