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  <updated>2026-09-29T11:34:24.481839+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88857</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-88857</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:34:24.526734+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla &lt; 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88857"/>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7jj4-5xhm-pp7r</id>
    <title>GHSA-7jj4-5xhm-pp7r</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T11:34:24.526825+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla &lt; 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7jj4-5xhm-pp7r"/>
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