<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T08:48:57.523312+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85058</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-85058</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T08:48:57.528105+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Moquette is a lightweight Java MQTT broker. Prior to 0.18.1, PostOffice.publishWill publishes a client-controlled Last Will message through publish2Subscribers without invoking the authorizator.canWrite check used by normal PUBLISH paths. When anonymous access is enabled and topic ACLs restrict writes, a remote client can set an ACL-protected topic as the Last Will Topic during CONNECT and perform an abnormal client disconnect, causing the broker to inject attacker-controlled messages into a topic for which the client lacks write permission. This issue is fixed in version 0.18.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85058"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx</id>
    <title>GHSA-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx — io.moquette:moquette-broker has a Missing Authorization issue</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T08:48:57.528257+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.moquette:moquette-broker</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Moquette MQTT Broker fails to enforce ACL write permission checks when publishing Will (Last Will and Testament) messages on behalf of disconnected clients. All normal PUBLISH paths (`receivedPublishQos0`, `receivedPublishQos1`, `receivedPublishQos2`) correctly invoke `authorizator.canWrite()` before publishing, but the Will message publishing path (`fireWill()` → `publishWill()` → `publish2Subscribers()`) completely bypasses this authorization check.</p>
<p>This allows an unauthenticated attacker (when `allow_anonymous=true`, which is the default) to inject arbitrary messages into any ACL-protected topic by setting a restricted topic as the Will Topic in the CONNECT packet and then disconnecting abruptly via TCP RST.</p>
<p>Other major MQTT Broker implementations (Mosquitto, EMQX, HiveMQ) correctly enforce ACL checks on Will messages, confirming this is a bug, not a design choice.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>In the MQTT protocol, a client can declare a "Will" topic and message in the CONNECT packet. When the client disconnects abnormally (without sending a DISCONNECT packet), the Broker publishes the Will message on behalf of the client. Although the Will message content (topic and payload) is entirely controlled by the connecting client — making it functionally equivalent to a PUBLISH — Moquette skips the ACL check for this path.</p>
<p>### Root Cause</p>
<p>**File**: `broker/src/main/java/io/moquette/broker/PostOffice.java` (v0.18.0)</p>
<p>Will publishing path (lines 286-328) — **no canWrite() check**:…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9jjc-fw8x-fmwx"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
