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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-03T09:12:56.240602+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84720</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-84720</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:12:57.246421+00:00</updated>
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        <p>A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The
WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats
artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore
accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from
the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied,
a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses
the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any
authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover,
character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including
across organizations.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84720"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h789-rmcq-fh7h</id>
    <title>GHSA-h789-rmcq-fh7h</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:12:57.246564+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>A flaw was found in the Ansible Automation Platform automation-controller. The
WorkflowJobNode.ancestor_artifacts database column, which stores the raw merged set_stats
artifacts propagated between workflow nodes, is not wrapped in prevent_search() and is therefore
accepted for arbitrary field lookups by the REST filter backend, even though it is omitted from
the API serializer. Because the column is persisted before Ansible's no_log masking is applied,
a user with only read access to a workflow — or, via a regular-expression lookup that bypasses
the JSON cross-relation filter guard through the world-readable credential-types endpoint, any
authenticated user with no roles — can use the result count as a boolean/count oracle to recover,
character by character, secret values that a playbook author explicitly marked no_log, including
across organizations.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h789-rmcq-fh7h"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:71113</id>
    <title>RHSA-2026:71113 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 Product Security and Bug Fix Update</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T09:12:57.246610+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Automation-Controller: automation-controller: Kubernetes service account token exfiltration via HashiCorp Vault credential SSRF encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal mime: golang: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header sqlparse: sqlparse: Denial of Service via quadratic CPU consumption in SQL parsing net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input encoding/xml: golang: Go: Denial of Service via XML decoding recursion depth issue net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service via crafted YAML documents sqlparse: sqlparse: Denial of Service via inefficient SQL parsing nanoid: nanoid: Denial of Service via negative size input in non-secure module functions gitpython: GitPython: Environment variable exfiltration via attacker-controlled clone URL gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via command injection due to unguarded Git options gitpython: GitPython: Command Injection via Git option prefix abbreviation postcss: PostCSS: Information disclosure via crafted sourceMappingURL automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: Named-URL 404 body oracle enable…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:71113"/>
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