<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:18.754017+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-81001</id>
    <title>BELL-CVE-2026-81001</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:19.490901+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-81001"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81001</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-81001</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:19.490999+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()</p>
<p>slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&gt;priv_destructor.</p>
<p>priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:</p>
<p>/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;net_todo_list, &amp;list);</p>
<p>__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;dev-&gt;dev.kobj);</p>
<p>So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:</p>
<p>CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81001"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p</id>
    <title>GHSA-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:19.491114+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync()</p>
<p>slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on
them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under
rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which
sl_setup() installs as dev-&gt;priv_destructor.</p>
<p>priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately
runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting
for the device refcount to drop:</p>
<p>/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */
	list_replace_init(&amp;net_todo_list, &amp;list);</p>
<p>__rtnl_unlock();
	...
		if (dev-&gt;priv_destructor)
			dev-&gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */
		if (dev-&gt;needs_free_netdev)
			free_netdev(dev);
		...
		/* Free network device */
		kobject_put(&amp;dev-&gt;dev.kobj);</p>
<p>So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at
all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published
and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and
released the device:</p>
<p>CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)
                                   unregister_netdev()
                                     rtnl_unlock()
                                       netdev_run_todo()
                                         __rtnl_unlock()
  rtnl_lock()
  sl_sync()
    dev = slip_devs[i]
                                         priv_destructor(dev)…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pxg4-rg6h-vm8p"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1</id>
    <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11880-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:19.491200+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11880-1"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81001</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-81001</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T12:13:19.491733+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: fix use-after-free in sl_sync() slip_devs[] stores bare net_device pointers and takes no reference on them.  sl_sync() and sl_alloc() walk that table from slip_open() under rtnl_lock(), while an entry is dropped by sl_free_netdev(), which sl_setup() installs as dev-&gt;priv_destructor. priv_destructor is called from netdev_run_todo(), which deliberately runs with the RTNL semaphore released so that it can sleep while waiting for the device refcount to drop: 	/* Snapshot list, allow later requests */ 	list_replace_init(&amp;net_todo_list, &amp;list); 	__rtnl_unlock(); 	... 		if (dev-&gt;priv_destructor) 			dev-&gt;priv_destructor(dev);	/* slip_devs[i] = NULL */ 		if (dev-&gt;needs_free_netdev) 			free_netdev(dev); 		... 		/* Free network device */ 		kobject_put(&amp;dev-&gt;dev.kobj); So rtnl_lock() does not serialise slip_open() against the teardown at all.  sl_sync() can load slip_devs[i] while the entry is still published and dereference it after netdev_run_todo() has run the destructor and released the device:   CPU0 (slip_open)                 CPU1 (slip_close)                                    unregister_netdev()                                      rtnl_unlock()                                        netdev_run_todo()                                          __rtnl_unlock()   rtnl_lock()   sl_sync()     dev = slip_devs[i]                                          priv_destructor(dev)…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-81001"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
