Semantic MediaWiki is a free, open-source extension to MediaWiki that lets users store and query data within the wiki's pages. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.1.0, `Special:Ask` accepts a `cursor` query parameter for keyset pagination (added in 7.0.0). The token is decoded by `CursorEncoder`, which is an **unsigned** base64url-encoded JSON blob, so its contents are fully attacker-controlled. When the cursor's sort anchor does not match the request's `sort=` / `order=`, `QueryCreator::applyCursorIfRequested()` builds an error message by interpolating the attacker-controlled `sort_prop` / `sort_order` values into a raw string via `Query::addErrors()`. Unlike SMW's message-key errors, this raw string bypasses the message layer's sanitization (`ProcessingErrorMsgHandler::normalizeAndDecodeMessages()` passes a non-key, non-encoded string through unchanged). `ErrorWidget::queryError()` then assembles the errors and passes them to `Html::errorBox()`, whose first argument is emitted as raw HTML. The result is a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability: a crafted `cursor` token containing markup in `sort_prop` (or `sort_order`) executes script in the victim's browser on the wiki origin. No authentication or special permission is required. The payload is delivered via a crafted link. Version 7.2.0 contains a fix.

Affected: Packagist: mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki

## Reflected XSS via a forged cursor pagination token

#### Failure mode

`Special:Ask` accepts a `cursor` query parameter for keyset pagination (added in 7.0.0). The token is decoded by `CursorEncoder`, which is an **unsigned** base64url-encoded JSON blob, so its contents are fully attacker-controlled. When the cursor's sort anchor does not match the request's `sort=` / `order=`, `QueryCreator::applyCursorIfRequested()` builds an error message by interpolating the attacker-controlled `sort_prop` / `sort_order` values into a raw string via `Query::addErrors()`.

Unlike SMW's message-key errors, this raw string bypasses the message layer's sanitisation (`ProcessingErrorMsgHandler::normalizeAndDecodeMessages()` passes a non-key, non-encoded string through unchanged). `ErrorWidget::queryError()` then assembles the errors and passes them to `Html::errorBox()`, whose first argument is emitted as raw HTML. The result is a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability: a crafted `cursor` token containing markup in `sort_prop` (or `sort_order`) executes script in the victim's browser on the wiki origin.

No authentication or special permission is required. The payload is delivered via a crafted link, e.g. `Special:Ask?q=...&p[cursor]=<forged token>` where the token decodes to `{"v":1,"sort_prop":"<script>...</script>"}`. Confirmed executing in a browser; the responses carry no Content-Security-Policy, so inline script is not blocked.

#### Remediation

- Output-encode the attacker-co…