<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-01T16:54:01.752136+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77266</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-77266</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T16:54:01.756049+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, upload_attachment accepts absolute paths and traversal sequences without constraining the resolved path to the server workspace. An MCP caller with attachment access can read a chosen server-local file and exfiltrate it through Jira or Confluence. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through upload_attachment, file_path, and path traversal, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77266"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mfv2-4wvm-9pgp</id>
    <title>GHSA-mfv2-4wvm-9pgp — MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read and exfiltration via MCP tool call</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T16:54:01.756271+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-atlassian</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The `upload_attachment` functions in both the Jira and Confluence modules accept a user-controlled `file_path` parameter and open the specified file for reading **without calling `validate_safe_path()`**. An authenticated MCP client can supply an arbitrary path such as `/etc/passwd` or `/proc/self/environ`, causing the server process to read and transmit the file's contents to the remote Atlassian instance as an attachment.</p>
<p>This is an **incomplete fix** relative to GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4: the `download_attachment` and `download_issue_attachments` paths were hardened with `validate_safe_path()`, but the upload direction was left unguarded in both the Jira and Confluence modules.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>**Affected functions:**</p>
<p>| File | Function | Line |
|------|----------|------|
| `src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py` | `upload_attachment()` | ~372–415 |
| `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` | `upload_attachment()` | ~62–108 |
| `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py` | `_upload_attachment_direct()` | ~476–477 |</p>
<p>**Jira — vulnerable code path (`jira/attachments.py`):**</p>
<p>```python
def upload_attachment(self, issue_key: str, file_path: str) -&gt; dict:
    ...
    if not os.path.isabs(file_path):
        file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path)   # resolves relative paths</p>
<p>if not os.path.exists(file_path):             # confirms file exists
        ...</p>
<p># ⚠ validate_safe_path() is NEVER called here
    filename = os.path.basename(file_path)
    with…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mfv2-4wvm-9pgp"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
