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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-02T10:39:12.746132+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76648</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-76648</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T10:39:12.763411+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>CopyAPIView (awx/awx/api/generics.py:873) sets permission_classes =
(IsAuthenticated,), so DRF's get_object() performs no object-level
RBAC. The get() handler (lines 988–991) explicitly guards with
request.user.can_access(obj._class_, 'read', obj) — but post()
(lines 1001–1010) does not. POST only checks:</p>
<p>can_access(model, 'add', create_kwargs_check)</p>
<p>can_access(model, 'copy_related', obj)</p>
<p>For JobTemplate, can_add (awx/awx/main/access.py:1465–1520) gates on</p>
<p>inventory.use_role + project.use_role +
execution_environment.read_role — resource-level roles that do not
imply read on the source JT — and can_copy_related (1522–1534) checks
only credentials.use_role. None of these imply the caller can read the
source JT.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76648"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-26cj-h793-xx7v</id>
    <title>GHSA-26cj-h793-xx7v</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T10:39:12.763558+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>CopyAPIView (awx/awx/api/generics.py:873) sets permission_classes =
(IsAuthenticated,), so DRF's get_object() performs no object-level
RBAC. The get() handler (lines 988–991) explicitly guards with
request.user.can_access(obj._class_, 'read', obj) — but post()
(lines 1001–1010) does not. POST only checks:</p>
<p>can_access(model, 'add', create_kwargs_check)</p>
<p>can_access(model, 'copy_related', obj)</p>
<p>For JobTemplate, can_add (awx/awx/main/access.py:1465–1520) gates on</p>
<p>inventory.use_role + project.use_role +
execution_environment.read_role — resource-level roles that do not
imply read on the source JT — and can_copy_related (1522–1534) checks
only credentials.use_role. None of these imply the caller can read the
source JT.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-26cj-h793-xx7v"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:71177</id>
    <title>RHSA-2026:71177 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7 Container Release Update</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T10:39:12.763593+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>ansible-automation-platform: privilege escalation via excessive group writable /etc/passwd permissions urllib3: urllib3: Unbounded decompression chain leads to resource exhaustion lxml: lxml-html-clean: lxml: URL bypass vulnerability in Cleaner via missing xlink:href github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Host-root command execution via unvalidated image config labels in CRI plugin github.com/containerd/containerd: containerd: Security bypass via Container Device Interface (CDI) annotation smuggling during checkpoint restoration. sqlparse: sqlparse: Denial of Service via quadratic CPU consumption in SQL parsing sqlparse: sqlparse: Denial of Service via inefficient SQL parsing automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: Named-URL 404 body oracle enables cross-tenant resource name enumeration automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: JobJobEventsChildrenSummary               RBAC bypass exposes cross-tenant job event tree structure automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: Any authenticated user reads Red Hat subscription/license details via /config/ automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: Verbose internal exception               disclosure via HostList bare-Exception handler automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: CUSTOM_VENV_PATH setting provides filesystem path-existence oracle on co…</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/rhsa-2026:71177"/>
  </entry>
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