CodeWhale versions before 0.8.64 contain an environment variable exposure vulnerability in the js_execution tool that fails to scrub parent process environment variables before spawning Node.js. Attackers can craft malicious JavaScript code executed by the tool to read process.env and leak API keys, cloud credentials, and authentication tokens back to the model context.

Affected: crates.io: deepseek-tui, npm: deepseek-tui, crates.io: codewhale-tui, npm: codewhale

### Maintainer resolution

The CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 26de44a8bd5051f8f944ea60b2c37ae1d2b7d25e. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.

### Summary

js_execution exposes parent process environment to model-provided JavaScript

The js_execution tool spawns Node with tokio::process::Command::new without calling the child_env scrubber that exec_shell, the Python REPL, and the MCP launcher all use. Model-provided JavaScript reads process.env and the values flow back to the parent transcript as the tool's stdout, exposing API keys, cloud credentials, and forge tokens to the next model turn.

### Details

In `crates/tui/src/tools/js_execution.rs` (v0.8.37, lines 91-105):

```rust let temp_dir = tempfile::tempdir() .map_err(|e| ToolError::execution_failed(format!("tempdir failed: {e}")))?; let script_path = temp_dir.path().join("js_execution.js"); tokio::fs::write(&script_path, code) .await .map_err(|e| ToolError::execution_failed(format!("tempfile write failed: {e}")))?;

let mut cmd = tokio::process::Command::new(&node); cmd.arg(&script_path); cmd.current_dir(workspace);

let output = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(120), cmd.output()) .await .map_err(|_| ToolError::Timeout { seconds: 120 }) .and_then(|res| res.map_err(|e| ToolError::execution_failed(e.to_string())))…