https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-04T13:21:43.545017+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73842 fkie_cve-2026-73842 2026-10-04T13:21:47.492632+00:00

OpenChoreo is a complete, open-source developer platform for Kubernetes. Prior to 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0-rc.2, internal/cluster-gateway/server.go exposed /api/proxy/, /api/exec/, and /api/wirelogs/ on an internal listener without requiring a client certificate or token, allowing any network-reachable caller to read tenant Kubernetes Secrets, mutate workloads, and execute commands across connected data planes. This issue is fixed in versions 1.0.3, 1.1.3, and 1.2.0-rc.2.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rh53-xvx2-j327 GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327 — OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only — data-plane Secret d… 2026-10-04T13:21:47.492810+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo

### Summary

The OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as "read-only," the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.

### Impact

An attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:

- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions. - Workload tampering or destruction — creating, modifying, or deleting Deployments, Services, and other resources. - Pod command execution inside workload pods via `/api/exec/`.

This is also the missing second authorization layer behind GHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmx (the openchoreo-api exec/wirelogs cross-project authorization bypass): beca…