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  <updated>2026-10-04T11:00:45.296621+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65007</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-65007</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T11:00:45.624796+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Grav api plugin (grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.8 fails to properly authorize API key generation and revocation: the plugin intercepts the apiKeyGenerate/apiKeyRevoke admin tasks before the account-management ACL runs and authorizes the caller on only the admin.login permission (the baseline permission held by every panel user). This allows any user with admin.login to mint a persistent API key bound to any account, and the forged key inherits the target account's API permissions. On installs where an API-enabled account holds broader permissions, this enables account impersonation and privilege escalation up to account takeover.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65007"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6m96-62fv-f2wh</id>
    <title>GHSA-6m96-62fv-f2wh</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T11:00:45.624892+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The Grav api plugin (grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.8 fails to properly authorize API key generation and revocation: the plugin intercepts the apiKeyGenerate/apiKeyRevoke admin tasks before the account-management ACL runs and authorizes the caller on only the admin.login permission (the baseline permission held by every panel user). This allows any user with admin.login to mint a persistent API key bound to any account, and the forged key inherits the target account's API permissions. On installs where an API-enabled account holds broader permissions, this enables account impersonation and privilege escalation up to account takeover.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6m96-62fv-f2wh"/>
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