Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, the class-definition import endpoint /pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/{id}/import accepts a DataObject field name that is emitted without an identifier allowlist by lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php into generated PHP properties and by models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Helper/Dao.php into ALTER TABLE identifiers. An authenticated user with the objects permission can inject PHP syntax into the generated DataObject class, causing attacker-controlled code in generated var/classes/DataObject/.php files to run when an object of that class is instantiated, and can also inject SQL identifier content into schema-changing statements. The central models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data.php::setName() validation did not reject semicolons, braces, backticks, spaces, or other non-identifier characters. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Affected: Packagist: pimcore/pimcore

## Overview

A DataObject **class-definition field name** is concatenated, without an identifier allowlist, into the PHP class source that Pimcore generates for every DataObject class (`protected $<fieldName>;`). A user holding only the ordinary `objects` (DataObjects) permission can import a class definition whose field name closes the property and injects arbitrary PHP into the generated class file, achieving remote code execution on the server. The same unvalidated field name is also concatenated into ALTER TABLE DDL (`ADD COLUMN`/`ADD INDEX`), giving a parallel SQL-injection primitive. This is a sibling of CVE-2026-5394 (composite-index column SQL injection); that fix hardened only the `compositeIndices` sink and left the field-name path untouched.

## Impact

Any authenticated user with the `objects` permission — the standard permission for content editors who work with DataObjects, not an administrator or a dedicated "classes" permission — can:

1. **Execute arbitrary PHP on the server (RCE).** The injected code runs in the web application's PHP process when an object of the affected class is loaded (and is re-executed on every load), with full access to the application, its database credentials, secrets, and the host filesystem/OS — i.e. full server compromise. 2. **Execute arbitrary ALTER TABLE DDL (SQL injection)** against the DataObject store/query tables (drop columns, add indexes, corrupt schema). **Confidence (read with the Reproduction section).** The RCE sink…