Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override (CWE-295)

Affected: Go: code.gitea.io/gitea

Summary

Gitea's internal API HTTP client (modules/private/internal.go) hardcodes TLSClientConfig.InsecureSkipVerify = true with no configuration override. It is the only outbound TLS client in the codebase that cannot be made to verify its peer's certificate — webhook, migrations, MinIO, LDAP, SMTP, Redis and incoming-mail all expose a secure-by-default SkipVerify toggle, this one does not.

When an operator configures internal communication over HTTPS to a non-loopback target (LOCAL_ROOT_URL=https://<host>/ in a split-host / multi-pod topology), the gitea serv / gitea hook subprocess that calls the internal API will accept ANY TLS certificate. An attacker with on-path position on that internal segment can MITM the connection and capture the static high-privilege INTERNAL_TOKEN, which is the sole authentication for every /api/internal/* endpoint (server shutdown/restart, SSH key authorization, git command execution, repo hooks, mail send, runner-token generation).

Severity is deployment-dependent: High for split-host HTTPS deployments; Low/Informational for the default single-host / unix-socket / HTTP-loopback deployment, where the call is loopback and not interceptable without local access (which already exposes the token directly). This report is rated for the affected configuration and the underlying defense-in-depth defect. Details

Affected component: modules/private/internal.go

The internal API transport hardcodes certificate-verification bypass:

var internalAP…