https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-05T05:30:44.830358+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54178 fkie_cve-2026-54178 2026-10-05T05:30:44.832559+00:00

backpack/crud provides Create, Read, Update & Delete (CRUD) functions for Backpack, a collection of Laravel packages that help users build custom administration panels. Prior to 6.8.12 and 7.0.35, HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk in src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php trusts disk-relative paths from clear_<attribute>[] and passes them to Storage::disk()->delete without confirming that the paths are persisted on the current model record. An authenticated user with Update access to a CRUD using this mutator through src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php can delete another record's attachment, a shared asset, or another operational file on the configured disk by submitting its path. The newer MultipleFiles uploader is not affected because it intersects requested deletions with the record's persisted file list. This flaw does not permit reading the deleted files. The 5.x line remains affected through its final releases. This issue is fixed in versions 6.8.12 and 7.0.35.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-8xjm-wqrp-2f25 GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25 — Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_<attr>[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipl… 2026-10-05T05:30:44.832698+00:00

Affected: Packagist: backpack/crud

## Summary

`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_<attribute>[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.

An authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_<attr>[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.

The safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.

## Affected code

- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink) - `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models

The vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.

## Impact

An attacker with low-privilege Backpack admin access (e.g. a content editor) can delete any file under the configured disk root: other records' attachments, shared assets, or files placed on the same disk for operational purposes. No confidentiality impact (files cannot be read, only deleted).

**CWE-285** (Aut…