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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T18:19:53.910526+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47417</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47417</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T18:19:54.930181+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints (`POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/comments` and `GET .../comments`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then call `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` and `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying that `issue_id` belongs to `workspace_id`. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read every comment on, and post new comments to, any issue in any other workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47417"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cp4f-5m9r-5jc2</id>
    <title>GHSA-cp4f-5m9r-5jc2 — praisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment re…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T18:19:54.930314+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints (`POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/comments` and `GET .../comments`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then call `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` and `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying that `issue_id` belongs to `workspace_id`. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read every comment on, and post new comments to, any issue in any other workspace `W2`.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py`, lines 143-171; `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/comment_service.py`, lines 19-53.
**Root cause:** the route extracts `workspace_id` from the URL path and uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied `issue_id` straight into `CommentService` without confirming that this issue exists in `workspace_id`. `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` runs `SELECT * FROM comments WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace join. `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` blindly writes a row with that `issue_id`. Both flows trust the URL-supplied issue ID as authoritative even though the membership check guarantees nothing about it.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py`, lines 143-171.</p>
<p>```python
@router.post("/{issue_id}/comments", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=status.HTT…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-cp4f-5m9r-5jc2"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2933</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2933 — praisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment re…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T18:19:54.930427+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The comment endpoints (`POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/comments` and `GET .../comments`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then call `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` and `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying that `issue_id` belongs to `workspace_id`. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read every comment on, and post new comments to, any issue in any other workspace `W2`.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py`, lines 143-171; `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/comment_service.py`, lines 19-53.
**Root cause:** the route extracts `workspace_id` from the URL path and uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied `issue_id` straight into `CommentService` without confirming that this issue exists in `workspace_id`. `CommentService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` runs `SELECT * FROM comments WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace join. `CommentService.create(issue_id=issue_id, ...)` blindly writes a row with that `issue_id`. Both flows trust the URL-supplied issue ID as authoritative even though the membership check guarantees nothing about it.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py`, lines 143-171.</p>
<p>```python
@router.post("/{issue_id}/comments", response_model=CommentResponse, status_code=status.HTT…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2933"/>
  </entry>
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